See this interesting article in Newsweek.
A Return to Economist Friedrich Hayek's Ideas - Newsweek
PL.
I always seem to be in the minority, on the outside, swimming against the current.
A Return to Economist Friedrich Hayek's Ideas - Newsweek
PL.
David Prychitko has written a very interesting article, just published in the latest issue of the Review of Austrian Economics. It is a timely consideration of the ideas of a prominent Keynesian, Hyman Minsky, on the question of the alleged inherent instability of the financial system (actually all capitalist financial systems).
Minsky was a devoted Keynesian, but an imaginative one. He extends and deepens Keynes’s ideas, making them more plausible and intuitive. His main instrument is a very useful taxonomy of types of finance. There are three types, hedge finance, speculative finance and Ponzi finance. They escalate in degree of risk. When the revenue stream from an investment is confidently expected to pay all expenditure streams at every moment in the future we have hedge finance. With speculative finance there are some holes; near-term expenditures may exceed revenues, the hope being that in the longer term, revenues and capital gains will redress the balance. Ponzi finance is a situation in which in which interest on the debt actually exceeds revenue flows. (In passing we could note that this is a nice framework not only for analyzing the behavior of individuals, but also, even more relevantly, of the state.)
Minsky’s story uses this taxonomy to explain how a cycle is composed of the progression of economic agents from hedge finance to Ponzi finance before an inevitable collapse. He claims that the take off from hedge to speculative finance is inevitable, the Minsky-moment at which the start of the boom occurs. Prychitko, while giving us an appreciation of Minsky’s work, criticizes him for not providing an explanation of the genesis of this progression from tranquil business as usual to escalating speculative positions. Of course the Austrian explanation is the credit cycle ignited by what is so charmingly referred to today as “quantitative easing” by the central bank. For the rest you need to read this wonderful article which provides Austrians with a welcome window into the other world.
I would like to add a note on one aspect of this fundamental debate with the Keynesians. Prychitko claims that Minsky has no explanation of the Minsky-moment and implies, I think, that without such an explanation we are at a loss to understand how any cycle would occur. Why would entrepreneurs ever abandon their commitment to hedge finance? What provokes them to take on more risk to the point of financial meltdown? I think this is basically correct. But I want to guard against the possible conclusion that what is being claimed is that, absent governmental monetary mismanagement, no cycles would ever occur.
Of course Keynes’s explanation (surely implicit in Minsky) is rooted in casual social psychology. Entrepreneurs display “animal spirits” and are susceptible to waves of optimism and pessimism. There is “herding.” Asset values, being inherently subjective, very sensitive to projected future revenues, are subject to large, unpredictable, connected swings. So the explanation of the Minsky-moment is that eventually financial tranquility is bound to be disturbed by a contagion of unrealistic optimistic expectations. And the rest is history.
My own take on this is as follows: I think there is an element of truth in what Keynes says. I think, even in the absence of monetary mismanagement, there would be cycles. In fact, cycles are part of the experimental, evolutionary nature of the market process. All action is based on expectations. The epistemological basis of some expectations is more solid than others. In the realm of business investment, particularly in an environment of innovation and rapid change, the knowledge-base is quite tenuous. Entrepreneurs pit their conflicting expectations against each other. Most of them (and maybe all of them) will be wrong. Hence, where the investment environment invites imaginative visions (for example the late 1800’s and early 1900’s, the 1990s) we are bound to get a clustering of errors. It is inherent in the market process.
There are a number of reasons why the “people should know better” argument doesn’t work against this. Firstly, even though it may be perfectly clear that asset values are unrealistically high, and must eventually be corrected, investors do not know when this correction will come and are anxious to ride the boom as long as they can. There is a kind of brinkmanship. That this occurs is, I think, undeniable. Second, one could argue that memory is fatally selective. We remember the more recent past better than the more distant, especially when the latter belongs to previous generations. So, for example, the discrediting of Keynesian ideas is not remembered as well by the current generation as by those who lived through the 1970’s and early 1980’s. Third, there is the “each episode is unique” syndrome (a kind of pop “historicist” anti-Mengerian approach); this is a “new economy” in which the old rules don’t apply. And there may be other, similar arguments. I think it not implausible to suggest that the “dark forces of time and ignorance” do make for a world of unavoidable turbulence.
So what? Well the power of the Austrian argument derives not from asserting that without government mismanagement cycles could be avoided; it comes rather from the anti-utopian argument that this world is not perfect. It is extremely complex, it churns, it surges, and it progresses. The trick is to allow it to play out and not think you can achieve smooth sailing by interfering with it. Striving for the impossible produces highly exaggerated cycles and messes up the ability of the process to filter information, to sift the viable projects from the others. Absent government mismanagement, the boom comes to a natural end because the waves of optimistic investment put an increasing strain on the supply of loanable funds and push up interest rates. The most insane thing you can do is attempt to prolong the boom by trying to keep down the cost of increasingly scarce credit.
But this is the view of someone who believes that the market process is inherently stable. Cycles will occur, but the financial markets, if unencumbered, can accommodate them. Cycles are mitigated by the homeostatic properties of the market, which work fast enough to correct any run-away waves of optimism and pessimism, to prevent social dysfunction or collapse.
The Keynesians quite simply do not believe this. They believe that the market system is inherently unstable, that herding behaviors, if not checked by enlightened leadership, could result in financial and social collapse, in disaster and catastrophe.
[At least that is the story. It’s hard to know how sincere this is and to what extent it is just a pretext for the desire to engage in large scale Robin-Hood-type income distribution. In addition, it totally ignores the unrealism of assuming that government leadership has the ability (knowledge) to, and can be trusted to, do the job. That is, it ignores the incentive and knowledge problems that economic policy must face. It asserts market failure but ignores government failure.]
As a theoretical matter, the stability of the market system cannot be proved. Stability (and convergence) rests (among other things) on the speed with which the undeniable homeostatic forces (like price flexibility) work relative to the speed of other changes. We have no robust theory of behavior in disequilibrium and without one we cannot prove the stability of a system of interconnected markets. The confident assertion that the market system is not inherently unstable (which I do firmly believe) derives from a particular understanding of how markets work plus a particular reading of history. Theoretically the world need not work the way it does. It could be closer to the one envisioned by Keynes, but it isn’t.
The absence of a knock-down argument (theoretical or empirical – history does not speak with one voice) is the reason I even have to write something like this; it is the reason discredited ideas get recycled. It makes our jobs much more difficult. But I guess there is an upside to that.
The article linked below is not a very good defense of Israel as a Jewish state. I think it can be stated much more simply.
Is the idea of an official religion for a nation-state consistent with pure liberal democracy (libertarian values)?
I think the answer is definitely "no." (Of course, the whole idea of a nation-state may not be consistent with this ideal anyway. Libertarians don't like the idea of any collectives, like "nation." But they exist nevertheless.) Hence America, and some other liberal democracies, strive mightily to strike a neutral position on religion - making it a matter of private choice and practice as long as their adherents do not act coercively.
But this option is simply not on the table in the Middle East. Without exception every nation-state in the Middle East has an official religion, and except for Israel it is Islam. And, in every respect, without exception, Israel is closer to the liberal democratic ideal than any of its neighbors and enemies - the gap is enormous. To push a "peace-process" that results in a single, secular Israel-Palestinian state, is, as a practical matter, to place all of the Jews in Israel, (and many around the world) in grave danger.
There is ample evidence to indicate that this is no mere pretext. It is an essential part of Israel's character (as a nation, a set of institutional and cultural practices) that it has been, and continues to be, a safe-haven and a guardian for Jews everywhere. The vast majority of Jews now living in Israel came there, or descend from relatives who came there, from places where they were persecuted, often fleeing for their very lives. This is not a mere donning of the posture of victimhood, so common among other minorities, for political reasons. Israel asks for nothing except to be left alone in its tiny piece of real estate. It can fend for itself. It needs no "affirmative action."
Before we self-righteously push for a "peace-process" that results in a secular, Israel-Palestine, or even a secular Israel, we should demand the secularization and democratization of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the rest of them.
Douglas J. Feith: Can Israel Be Jewish and Democratic? - WSJ.com
In The Wall Street Journal, Douglas J. Feith of the Hudson Institute writes that many nations have laws and practices that recognize their majority group's history, language or religion while also protecting the rights of minorities.
The reason why we (collectively) don't learn from history is that we don't live long enough to remember it.
Those alive today who are old enough to have actually experienced, as thinking adults, the Carter, Reagan,Thatcher administrations and the ascendancy of the ideas of Friederich Hayek and Milton Friedman - leading to the widespread discrediting of Keynesian economics - are in the ineffective minority. The knowledge that counts for economic policy is very much based on actual experience (you had to live through it); it is tacit in nature, very difficult to transmit to someone who did not share the experience. Written history is a pale substitute for the real thing, and it frequently distorts.
So, every generation seems doomed to find out for itself what it should not do by doing it again - just like every child in the process of growing up.
Today, we can still hear sputtering echoes of the attempt to reignite the cold war around a crusade against “Islamo-fascism.” But the true mental captivity of our time lies elsewhere. Our contemporary faith in “the market” rigorously tracks its radical nineteenth-century doppelgänger—the unquestioning belief in necessity, progress, and History. Just as the hapless British Labour chancellor in 1929–1931, Philip Snowden, threw up his hands in the face of the Depression and declared that there was no point opposing the ineluctable laws of capitalism, so Europe’s leaders today scuttle into budgetary austerity to appease “the markets.”
But “the market”—like “dialectical materialism”—is just an abstraction: at once ultra-rational (its argument trumps all) and the acme of unreason (it is not open to question). It has its true believers—mediocre thinkers by contrast with the founding fathers, but influential withal; its fellow travelers—who may privately doubt the claims of the dogma but see no alternative to preaching it; and its victims, many of whom in the US especially have dutifully swallowed their pill and proudly proclaim the virtues of a doctrine whose benefits they will never see.
Above all, the thrall in which an ideology holds a people is best measured by their collective inability to imagine alternatives. We know perfectly well that untrammeled faith in unregulated markets kills: the rigid application of what was until recently the “Washington consensus” in vulnerable developing countries—with its emphasis on tight fiscal policy, privatization, low tariffs, and deregulation—has destroyed millions of livelihoods. Meanwhile, the stringent “commercial terms” on which vital pharmaceuticals are made available has drastically reduced life expectancy in many places. But in Margaret Thatcher’s deathless phrase, “there is no alternative.”
The second quote illustrates this as well. It is from an article by Arnold Relman commenting on an analysis of Obamacare by John Weinberg. My temptation is to just say, "what an idiot" and move on; but this stuff is taken seriously by apparently intelligent people. Like his suggestion that when we start treating health care as a right rather than as a business, like other countries do, we will be able to control costs. Yes, and the world is flat.
Wennberg’s painstaking documentation of overuse as a cause of excessive costs greatly helps our understanding of the US health care problem because it shows that costs could be controlled by eliminating unnecessary care, without rationing medically appropriate services. The clear implication of his work is that we could afford good care for all if we made our medical system more efficient and less wasteful.
What he does not emphasize is that to produce such change will require elimination of the economic forces that have made medical care a commodity in trade instead of a social service, and have transformed our health care system into a profit-seeking industry. Until we join other advanced countries in treating medical care as a right and not a business, we will have to wait for control of health costs.
The policy reaction by our government to the economic downturn is like a wealthy man going broke to impress his fleeting girlfriend. The man (i.e. our government) sees the woman (i.e. economy) is no longer interested and decides to lavish her with gifts. This excites the girl for a few months but she knows he can not keep spending at this rate and the gifts will soon disappear. The wealthy man does end up going broke but not until he puts himself into a massive amount of debt exhausting all his options to keep the woman by his side. Now the man, once wealthy and powerful is weak and the woman has moved on. Her lifestyle is not as lavish as before but she realizes that she is happy just living within her means. In the end, the two would have been better had they faced the music and let the relationship end abruptly when signs pointed to an end.
From all the rumors flying out of Washington, it sounds like our government has decided that it needs to shower the economy with more gifts to keep it steady. This will just cause a repeat of what already happened but with more unintended consequences as many including the author below explained.
Good time to be a stock picker. Bad time to be just about anyone else.