In his most recent book, We
stand Divided: The Rift between American Jews and Israel (New York: Harper
Collins, 2019), Daniel Gordis writes in his concluding chapter: “In 1880, the
combined Jewish population of the United States and Palestine totaled 275,000 people.
As the world’s Jewish population at that point was approximately 7.8 million,
these two communities represented a mere 3 percent of the world’s Jews. Today
the United States and Israel account for 85 percent of the world’s Jews.” (page
231). The remaining 15 percent of the world’s Jews are scattered in small communities
around the world, mainly the developed world. So, the U.S. and Israel
constitute the two arms of the body of world Jewry today. Israel is the center
and America is the center of the diaspora. Sadly, Gordis notes, these two communities
are, in many ways, even while existing in a crucial synergistic relationship,
at odds with one another. It is the purpose of this book to explain this rift
and, hopefully, by providing insight, contribute to its repair.
I highly recommend We stand
Divided. It is beautifully written, carefully researched, and provides much
food for thought, not to mention important information for all those wishing to
understand the nature and historical development of Jewish thought up to the
present time. On the nature of Zionism it is particularly useful. I will not
provide here a comprehensive book review. Rather, I want just to address a
limited set of points that underlie Gordis’s comprehensive analysis. I want to address
those aspects of his analysis that disturbed me most, not least because of the
degree of intractability I see involved in them.
In successive chapters Gordis analyzes
various reasons for the divide between American and Israeli Jews in general,
namely, the incessant conflict with the Palestinians and how Israel approaches
that, the particularist (as opposed to universalist) nature of Israeli nationalism
(Zionism), the contrast between Judaism in America as a religious identity and
Jewishness in Israel as a national/cultural identity, the mixing of church and
state in Israel’s legal regulatory system, and the “historically embedded”
lives of Israelis as opposed to the detached lives of Americans. It seems to me
that running through each of these is a common theme, one that Gordis treats in
passing, one that is peripheral to him but is central to me, and that is, in a nutshell,
the issue of the relationship between nationalism and individual rights.
Americans in general and
traditionally (much less so those adhering these days to ‘identity politics’)
think in terms in individual rights as the basis of their freedom. Their freedom
is individual freedom. They hold those “truths to be self-evident” that all
people (regardless of their ethnicity, race, background or group affiliation) are
entitled to equal freedom, everywhere. America is a country (perhaps the
only country in history) founded on the basis of universal individual rights.
To be American is not be of a particular blood line or race or ethnicity. To be
American is to embrace American ideals (notwithstanding the departures in our
history that have tarnished this). America is, as it were, a universalist
project. The ideals to which Americans at their best stand committed are applicable
to everyone, everywhere. Historical pronouncements are replete with
exhortations to the world in general to join in the American project to build a
society in which individuals are free and live peacefully together. With some accuracy
we may call this a commitment to liberal democracy (though it does not,
as is commonly assumed, necessarily imply a political democracy of any particular
kind).
By contrast, while it is true that
a large proportion, if not a majority, of Israelis also feel and profess a
general commitment to liberal democracy broadly conceived, this is not as
absolute for them as it is for Americans. In particular Israelis face the persistent
question of whether there is a tradeoff between Israel being a Jewish state and
being, at the same time, a liberal democracy, where everyone has equal individual
freedom. Gordis thinks there is such a tradeoff, and that Israelis in general
answer it by compromising on liberal democracy. But, far from this being a
criticism, he presents it as an inevitable difference between two peoples who
have experienced very different histories. It is not, according to him, that
either view is more moral or correct than the other. America aspires to be a
liberal democracy, Israel does not, because to be one would require sacrificing
the Jewishness of Israel. He asks us to think of Israel as an “ethnic democracy”.
It is when one considers the
implications of this that the nature of the divide becomes most apparent. For example,
Israel has laws that restrict the residence of Arabs (even Israeli Arabs) in
certain areas on the basis of preserving the Jewish nature of that area. For
Americans this is anathema, what they call “red-lining”. It is legalized racism.
And there are other similar restrictive laws. In fact almost 100% of the land of Israel is governed by government agencies, the most prominent being the ILA - Israel Lands Agency - that clearly, often overtly, discriminate against Israel's Arab citizens. It is ubiquitous and it is debilitating,
Then there is the monopoly of funerals, weddings, and conversions that the orthodox Israeli Jewish establishment has. This implies for example that marriages between Jews and non-Jews cannot take place in Israel. Again this is anathema to Americans. Gordis’s attempt to explain this in terms of understanding Israel’s origin and ongoing raison d’etre to provide a safe haven for the Jews of the world facing current or future oppression will strike many American readers as simple apologetics.
Then there is the monopoly of funerals, weddings, and conversions that the orthodox Israeli Jewish establishment has. This implies for example that marriages between Jews and non-Jews cannot take place in Israel. Again this is anathema to Americans. Gordis’s attempt to explain this in terms of understanding Israel’s origin and ongoing raison d’etre to provide a safe haven for the Jews of the world facing current or future oppression will strike many American readers as simple apologetics.
Gordis’s argument, shared by
many, is that these compromises to liberal democracy are necessary to preserve
the cultural identity of Israel. In addition to the very real physical threats
that Israelis face (the truth that they face a persistent overriding
existential threat to their physical being), they also face, according to this
argument, a threat to their culture that can only be resisted if the Jewish
nature of the state is preserved, and this requires ensuring, among other
things, that Jews remain the controlling majority of the population. It is an
argument that proceeds from the idea of the right to “national
self-determination” not individual rights.
In this light, the contrast could not be more stark. A principled individual rights approach, sees rights adhering solely to individuals. There is no coherence to the notion of collective rights, as in “the rights of the nation”. The latter is simply a set of weasel words used often to justify violations of individual rights for the “greater good” or some mythical national purpose. Gordis gets this right, but understates the coherence of the individual rights approach. He is, not surprisingly, no libertarian/classical liberal, though he is very appreciatively aware of its teachings, notably through the ideas of America's founders like Thomas Jefferson.
In this light, the contrast could not be more stark. A principled individual rights approach, sees rights adhering solely to individuals. There is no coherence to the notion of collective rights, as in “the rights of the nation”. The latter is simply a set of weasel words used often to justify violations of individual rights for the “greater good” or some mythical national purpose. Gordis gets this right, but understates the coherence of the individual rights approach. He is, not surprisingly, no libertarian/classical liberal, though he is very appreciatively aware of its teachings, notably through the ideas of America's founders like Thomas Jefferson.
I don’t want to minimize the
problem. Israel was founded at a time of unimaginable upheaval, for the world
and for the Jews in particular. After WWII millions of “displaced persons”
streamed across borders into new countries and many were held in refugee camps
for long periods. One third of the Jewish people had been murdered. European
Jewry had been destroyed in a matter of five years. In a few more years the age-old
Jewish communities of the Arab world were also destroyed as the Jews were
expelled. The Jewish population of Israel doubled. And this was but the
culmination of centuries of Jewish life across Europe in which the “Jewish
question” festered persistently. "The Jewish question" was a well-known phrase, the most graphic illustration of
which was, of course, the Dreyfus affair. Particularly in Eastern Europe by the
eve of WWII matters had become precarious for the Jews. For decades Jewish leaders
had worked for the establishment of a home for the Jewish people where they
could be “normal”. Israel is seen as the very embodiment of that project. And
its current policies are informed by that historical experience. Even now, as anti-Jewish
sentiment endures and emerges afresh in diverse places, Israel is seen by Israelis and others as the necessary safe-haven, insurance policy, for the Jews of the world.
Furthermore, given the historical
circumstance of its birth, in the dying days of the British Empire and of
colonialism in general, a certain cynical realpolitik was necessary to combat
the efforts of the mercurial British and their newfound Arab extremist allies
who objected to the settlement of Jews in Palestine because they were Jews, non-Muslims.
A deep seated ethnicity indeed permeates the neighborhood. This too is clear in
the minds of Israelis today.
And while it is true that Israel
does possess a legal system that is in many respects ethnically-based, it is also
true that by comparison to its neighbors, or, indeed, to any other country in
the Middle East, it shines supreme in the degree to which it is a liberal
democracy and in the way in which, notwithstanding its restrictionist laws, it
treats its minorities, including women and gays. There is simply no excuse, in
this regard, to hold Israel to a double standard, waxing belligerent
condemnation of Israeli policy while staying silent on the horrors occurring in
the rest of her neighborhood. On that I have harped persistently.
But having said all this, it still
remains that American Jews, contrary to what Gordis seems to hope, will never
be able to get comfortable with ethnically based social policies of the kind
that Israel has. In truth, they smack of the very impetus that propelled the
opposition to Jewish settlement in the first place. In American eyes, in my eyes,
these are not two morally equivalent worldviews. That is the sin of multi-culturalism.
If the principles of classical
liberalism are valid, they are universally valid. Sad to say, the use of the
phrase “apartheid state” has its explanation in this, though, based on what
apartheid really was, I firmly reject that phrase as applied to Israel.
I think, in the end, Gordis would
be better advised not to defend these laws as necessary evils in their current
form, including finding a rationale for the religious monopoly and its
intrusion into private decisions. I think of it differently. From an individual
rights perspective, people have a right to affiliate in groups in any way they see
fit as long as they act peacefully. It is the role of the state that is
problematic. Israelis look to the state to design and enforce their national/ethnic
aspirations and that is a problem. If the top priority is to preserve a Jewish
homeland, a safe haven for Jews, one need not do this from the very top. The
notion of a free republic in which “minority rights” are guaranteed is not
unreasonable. Minority rights means the rights of individuals to express
themselves religiously, culturally, educationally, etc. Some “situational”
conditions may have to be incorporated in the governance structure, as was
attempted, sadly unsuccessfully in the end, in Lebanon, with its arrangement to
share governance between Christians and Moslems. Perhaps some sort of federal arrangement
might work to prevent ethnic violence. But, in the end, I would maintain, to
deny equal freedom to the residents of any country on the basis of their
ethnicity remains unacceptable and that the desire to preserve cultural identity
and traditions (as opposed to physical safety) does not override this.
I am not an expert. These are my armchair
reactions to this excellent book.
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