I always seem to be in the minority, on the outside, swimming against the current.
Tuesday, November 20, 2012
From my FB page - The real Obama and why it matters.
This afternoon (November 17, 2012) I heard Richard Epstein talk on the implications of the recent election for the economy. He gave the annual distinguished scholar lecture as the SEA meetings. To hear Epstein talk is awe-inspiring. Hard to describe. Always without notes, he delivers intricate, clever, funny, insightful prose without hesitation, seamlessly weaving his web of logic, backwards and forward, while making knockdown points.
What he said today reinforced my conviction that Obama is by far the worse of the two candidates we faced in this election - though both were pretty bad. Epstein's knowledge of the details of each and every Obama program, the law, the economics, the bureaucracy, ... left me with little doubt on this score - and pretty pessimistic for what lies ahead. In addition Epstein has the rather unique advantage of knowing Obama personally from his University of Chicago days.
This is a situation where personality matters a lot. According to Epstein, Obama is the exact opposite of his convivial exterior. He is someone who is unlikely to change his mind on anything and who takes criticism extremely badly. He brings to the White House not your standard self-serving, but flexible politician. He is, rather, someone who is a principled and stubborn believer in policies and values antithetical to the health of the American economy and its civil society. His serious agenda is not the "liberal" agenda of the 1960's which focused on civil rights; rather it is the agenda of the Progressive era in America, wherein social planning politician sought, by the power of government, to redesign society from top to bottom. And you see this in every part of the various programs he has already addressed.
Healthcare, financial regulation, environmental policy, protectionism in international trade, trade unionism, education, and more. In every case Obama has skillfully constructed a powerful regulatory apparatus. Where he has been able to use Congress he has obtained the legislation he wanted (and designed), legislation deliberately vague, so as to leave as much discretion for the bureaucracy as possible. Where legislation was unnecessary, or unobtainable, he has resorted to administrative discretion, issuing decrees often without the necessary Congressional approval. He knows that the regulated companies and organizations have the option of either obeying or taking the government to court, and that the latter is costly inconvenient and risky, so they almost always comply. In this way, little by little, our freedoms are regulated away.
Epstein pointed out that the accumulating regulations act like taxes to sap the creative power of private economic initiatives and when combined with macro tax and spend policies can only have one outcome. The prospect for the future is one of dwindling growth, smaller technological advances, less capital investment in America and slowly declining standards of living, not only for or mostly for the 1%.
I wish I could do his analysis justice. I can't even come close. But he has expressed this in parts in various places available on the internet and I will be looking for them so as to be able to share more specific detail.
Friday, September 28, 2012
Foreign policy and the LALA doctrine.
The name of this blog Against the Current is accurate. But I don’t relish it. It saddens me. My latest disappointment comes upon finding that many with whom I agree on a great variety of issues, hold views that I consider to be untenable and even offensive when it comes to foreign policy.
I have said on this blog and elsewhere that foreign policy is out of my comfort zone – not my area of expertise. So now, provoked by my discomfort, I am taking the plunge. I don’t think I can avoid it any longer. Please accept these thoughts as very much the ruminations of an amateur with much to learn.
For clarity of exposition, permit me the inaccurate extensive use of the terms “we,” “us,” “they,” and “them”. Many of my friends take the L A L A approach – “leave them alone and they will leave us alone.” I think in many (most) cases, they may be right. But surely not in all cases. In most cases it may not matter. The default position should be “leave them alone.” We should not, without overwhelming evidence, assume that they are a real threat to us, one that justifies the kind of interventions that have occurred. I would argue our best position is mostly to wait and see and respond when absolutely necessary. Preemption may be indicated, but it needs to be very carefully justified.
I cannot but condemn much of the past and present actions of our international agencies and special forces who violate the freedoms and rights of domestic and foreign citizens sometimes with massive and enduring humanitarian consequences. The lack of success of almost all of our foreign invasions should give us pause as to what we can and should try to achieve. These “war actions” are types of central-planning and, as such, are doomed to fail. They face impossible knowledge problems in trying to build or rebuild societies and they face impossible incentive problems that prevent proper oversight, the detection and prevention of enormous waste and corruption. They are a very big part of our overgrown government and runaway fiscal problems, and are serious threats to the cause of freedom. Much more could, should and has been said about this – for example.
But, sometimes the threat IS real and significant. The tricky part is knowing when it is and (just as important) what to do about it. In these cases the LALA principle may not work.
The LALA principle rests on the assumption that it is OUR actions, our interventions, that are responsible for the hatred directed against us. The attack of 9/11 would not have occurred but for the cumulative affect of our provocative actions. This type of assertion meets with a very hostile reception. It seems to carry unpalatable moral implications, excusing acts of terror. And its proponents mostly poison the chances of it receiving adequate consideration by the contemptuous and patronizing way in which they present it. It may, however, be true. The traction and support that terrorists receive may be a result of the groundswell of resentment that we have created. The problem is, this is impossible to prove either way. And appeals to the history yield conflicting interpretations. This is no more evident that in the case of Israel vis a vis its enemies. In many ways the Israel-Palestinian situation is a microcosm of the bigger picture.
Some have asserted that (radical Islam) Islamism is a creature of our making and did not exist as a force until recently. But this is very contentious. Pan-Arabism, and the commitment to a unified Arabia cleansed of foreign influence, had strong affinities to Islamism. And the early Muslim Brotherhood, through its sister organization led by Haj Amin al-Husseini, the grand mufti of Jerusalem (an active Nazi propagandist), effectively disrupted any attempt at the establishment a peaceful two-state solution as conceived by the British partition plan and as embraced by many Jews and Arabs alike in 1948. Everything that has transpired since then is basically an unfolding of this initial fateful turn of events.
Applying the LALA principle to Israel in light of the history from 1948 till today, makes little sense to me. There the threat is real. And it is an existential threat. There is a fundamental asymmetry of goals. “Leave them alone” will not suffice to placate them, because they don’t want Israel there – see here. It is not what Israel does that is the problem – though it may aggravate the problem. It is where and what Israel is.
So my LALA friends who seem to think that all that needs to be done is to force the parties to sit down and talk, are sadly and dangerously deluded. Any attempt to achieve real peaceful coexistence has to begin with a plan to get acceptance of Israel’s right to exist by those who have power in the Arab world. Clearly some of my LALA friends understand this. So, they conclude maybe it is for the best if Israel did not exist. It is this kind of cavalier conclusion that shuts down any type of civil discourse. It stinks of anti-Semitism. See also here.
But this really has little to do with American foreign policy fundamentals. LALAs should refrain from statements that indicate how little they understand or appreciate the threats that Israel faces. Their position opposing government foreign aid and military intervention does NOT imply an anti-Israel position. It does not imply the need to vilify Israel or call for its demise. It does not imply denying the right of Israelis to defend themselves.
Thus while we might oppose any government funding of settlements and any coercive displacement of Palestinians to facilitate the establishment of settlements (as I do), we cannot, in good conscience, require of Israel to dismantle its checkpoints, dismantle its fence, and generally stand down in its attempt to combat acts of terror. That makes no sense. These measures have proven incredibly effective in keeping Israel’s population safe after suffering for years a horrendous barrage of attacks directed specifically against civilians, where they live, shop, learn, and play. These measures create great hardships, but, in the final analysis, they are effectively imposed on Israel as much as they are imposed on the Palestinians, by the presence of a real, credible, significant, terrifying danger. Similarly, calls for Israel to withdraw to 1967 borders, or beyond, make no sense. The same threats that exist now, existed before 1967 all the way back to 1948, except that Israel was defending less secure borders. The settlements are not the fundamental obstacle to peace. Nor is the “occupation.” The refusal to recognize Israel’s legitimacy, and actions taken in support of that, are the fundamental problems. The LALA principle does not apply.
On the matter of foreign policy more generally, I am much less confident. When considering the state of the Muslim world in general, and especially the ubiquity and nature of Islamic fundamentalism, I find it difficult to believe that all of the resentment we face can be attributed to our actions. There is a definite chicken-egg problem. But this may be no obstacle to a the achievement of a much smaller foreign footprint. Careful, but sensible and effective diligence may be called for rather than grand interventions.
The case of Iran is very problematic because we cannot be sure we are dealing with a “rational” opponent, one that can be deterred. The LALAs are confident that we are, that even if Iran were to get the bomb, they would be no more dangerous than Pakistan (not much comfort there) and would never use it for fear of the kind of retaliation it would provoke. Distorted news reporting on both sides make a good assessment very difficult.
War with Iran is becoming more likely. The trumpets are sounding. I think it would be a big mistake – a worse proposition than Iraq or Afghanistan. But what is the correct response short of the LALA position? Netanyahu wants to draw a red line around the processing of final-stage enriched uranium. I guess what he means is that if Iran should proceed past that step, its facilities – which are big and visible – should be bombed or otherwise destroyed. Not a full-scale war, but a terrifying prospect nevertheless – where would it lead?
This is as far as my amateur ruminations take me.
Wednesday, September 19, 2012
Israel, Obama and the Western tradition
HT:
Lawrence Rosenbloom.
It’s
hard for me to understand how so many Jews continue to think that Obama is a
friend of Israel. The inimitable Melanie Phillips provides ample evidence
(albeit just the tip of the iceberg) to show exactly the opposite.
My
biggest problem with Obama is not his attitude towards Israel. It’s much more
fundamental than this. Obama is quite simply un-American at his core – in
everything he stands for and does. By this I mean he is totally out of sympathy
with what America has meant to many from its inception – standing for the
values of constitutionalized individual freedom and responsibility. He is
ashamed of these core values and he has done and will do his best to sabotage
them – in socializing medicine, vilifying the profit motive and the achievement
of commercial success, regulating financial markets out of existence,
solidifying the power of the incredibly destructive public labor unions (being
heavily in their debt), destroying the power and incentive to produce cheap
energy, and generally expanding the power of government and the structure of
taxation to create a European nanny state. The devastation of the last four
years is manifest. Everywhere you look you see the establishment of open-ended
bureaucracies, empowered by pages and pages of yet-to-be specified rules and
regulations handed down by small committees with enormous discretion to control
prices and dictate the terms of private transactions. It is impossible to
overstate the danger he poses for the long-term freedom and financial stability
of each and every American. And the dangers are all the more daunting
because of their insidious nature, hiding as they are beneath the voluminous
padding of verbose sweeping regulatory documentation. Obama is, among his other
multiple personas, the consummate bureaucratic saboteur, ably assisted by a
talented team of like-minded arrogants. The prospect of another four years of
this keeps me awake at night.
His
stance on Israel is really only a corollary of his general mind-set. He is a
European-style universalist and apologist for all the virtues of Western
civilization and he regards Israel as a manifestation of that
tradition of “Western oppression.” It is just ridiculous to think that Obama represents the party that is in Israel’s interest. It is only because of
the powerful Christian bias toward Israel that Obama’s anti-Israel agenda is
likely to be ineffective.
For
the record: I am not an expert on foreign policy. I have big problems with the
policy stance of both major parties – with Romney and Obama, and with the
general presumption of the responsibility of America as the world’s policeman.
I believe a much less-involved America, would be stronger, would be better both
for America and for democracies like Israel. But that is beside the point to
what I say above.
Melanie Phillips
Into my inbox last week popped an email from Michelle Obama. "Thank you for an amazing week... Can you chip in $5 or more to stand with Barack today?"
For some reason, I have been on the Obama campaign mailing list for the past four years -- which is a hoot since, from the get-go, I have warned about Obama's extremist, Black-Power, Israel-hating background and circle, and that he would be a disaster for Israel and the west.
So it has proved. Yet astoundingly there are Jews who believe he has been the most Israel-friendly US president in history.
Which only goes to show the propensity of the liberal mind to outright hallucination when faced with the implosion of its shibboleths. The passion for Israel in the Bible-believing "red states" guarantees a level of support that not even the most virulent White House anti-Zionist could overturn.
But that doesn't mean a president can't undermine Israel by more circuitous means - as Obama has done. He has put Israel at grievous risk by his view of the world, which has neutralised America's power abroad and strengthened its enemies.
Although we are told he wants to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons, his limp dealings have allowed it to continue inexorably with its nuclear programme (despite reports of sabotage) and extend its power in the region.
Last week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton refused to issue a "red line" threat of ultimate force on the grounds that "negotiations are the best approach". But as Bibi protested in the row with Obama that boiled over this week, that allows Iran a clear run to the bomb. By the time the US decides Iran has to be forcibly stopped, it will be too late. It will already have the bomb.
Second, the Obama administration has consistently distanced America from Israel and cosied up instead to its Arab and Muslim attackers. Thus it backed the 2010 nuclear non-proliferation summit that singled out Israel for condemnation while excluding Iran from criticism - and has worked behind the scenes to neutralise Israel's nuclear deterrent, its ultimate defence against genocide.
It went ahead with a special operations exercise with 19 Arab and Muslim countries, while excluding Israel from a counter-terrorism conference at Turkey's insistence.
Last July, it invited the UN Commissioner for Human Rights and notorious Israel- critic Navi Pillay to "brief" the Security Council on Israel's supposed crimes - and in the process drew an effective moral equivalence between the behaviour of Israel and Syria.
Obama tried to bounce Israel into withdrawing to its 1949 "Auschwitz borders", pressured it over settlement building, which merely hardened Palestinian rejectionism, and failed to hold Mahmoud Abbas responsible for repeatedly declaring he would never accept Israel as a Jewish state.
Meanwhile, last week's Democratic convention descended into farce when its panicky attempt to restore references deleted from the party's programme to God, and to Jerusalem as Israel's capital, was booed.
Whether they were booing God, Jerusalem or the clearly out-of-order chairman is irrelevant. There was not even a two-thirds majority to put both deletions back into that Obama-centric programme - which still left out the party's previous rejection of Hamas, the Palestinian demand for unlimited immigration to Israel and any return to the 1949 borders.
This is a shocking way to treat an ally. When that ally is facing existential attack, it is unspeakable.
Obama is a menace to the security of Israel and the west and an American tragedy. What is astounding is that so many Jews refuse to see this and continue to support both him and his morally bankrupt Democratic Party. That is the Jewish tragedy.
Saturday, August 25, 2012
(Complex?) Thoughts on Heterogeneity and Complexity; Quality and Quantity
Considering the concept of heterogeneity throws light on the relationship between quantity and quality.
All observation and explanation proceeds on the basis of classification (categorization). Phenomena are grouped into categories according to our perception of their essential similarity (homogeneity). The elements of any category (class) might be different in some respects, but in all respects that ‘matter’ to us they are identical. Items within a particular category can be counted, quantified. The ability to quantify is crucially dependent on being able to count items in this manner. The number and type of categories (variables) is known and fixed. Thus, the arrival of a new category cannot be accommodated within a scheme of simple quantitative variation and must be considered to be a change in quality. Qualitative differences are categorical differences.
All quantitative modeling proceeds on the basis of the assumption that the individual elements of any given quantifiable variable are identical (homogeneous) and are different in some important respect from those of another variable. Variables are essentially distinguishable categories. In addition the elements of a quantifiable category do not interact with each other – else they could not be simply counted. Each element is an independent, identical instance of the class. (Most obvious is the case of ‘identical randomly distributed variables’). This does not preclude the elements themselves being complex – being the result of lower-level interactions, like identical molecules or biological cells, which are incredibly complex phenomena.
We may think of this in terms of structure. Structure implies connections/interactions. A structure is composed of heterogeneous items that are more than simply a list of those items. There is a sense of how the heterogeneous items work together to ‘produce’ something. (We see here how a capital-structure is both a metaphor for and a particular case of the phenomenon of complex structures in the world.) A structure is an ‘order’ in Hayek’s sense, in which it is possible to know something about the whole by observing the types and the ways in which they are related, without having to observe a totality of the elements. Structures are relational. Elements are defined not only by their individual characteristics but also by the manner in which they relate to other elements. These interactions are, in effect, additional variables.
Thus, though the elements of a quantifiable category may be unstructured, these elements may be composed of structured sub-elements. This is the basis of the phenomenon of modularity. Self-contained (possibly complex) modules may be quantified. This dramatically simplifies the organization of complex phenomena, as has been noted in a fast growing literature on the subject. Modularity is a ubiquitous phenomenon in both nature and in social organizations. It is an indispensable principle of hierarchically structured complex systems. The benefits of modularity in social settings include the facilitation of adjustment to change, and of product design, and the reaping of large economies in the use and management of knowledge (see for example work by Baldwin and Clark 2000, Langlois 2002, 2012) and it is clearly an aspect, perhaps the key aspect, of Lachmannian capital-structures. Capital-goods themselves are modules, which are creatively grouped into capital-combinations which constitute the modules of the (non-quantifiable) capital-structure.
Returning to the theme of the relationship between quantity and quality, quantitative modeling works when both the independent and dependent variables are meaningful, identifiable quantifiable categories that can be causally related. The model ‘works’ then in the sense of providing quantitative predictions. The inputs and outputs can be described in quantitative terms. But, when the outcome of the process described by the model is a new (novel) category of things, no such quantitative prediction is possible. Ambiguity in the type and number of categories in any system destroys the ability to meaningfully describe that system exclusively in terms of quantities. We have a sense then of the effects of heterogeneity. Variation applies to quantitative range.Heterogeneity (variety) applies to qualitative (categorical) range.Diversity incorporates both, but they are significantly different. Heterogeneity may not be necessary for complexity, but heterogeneity does militate in its favor. For example, compound interaction betweenquantitative variables (categories) can be an important characteristic of complex systems, but complex systems are likely to result from substantial heterogeneity, especially where heterogeneity is open-ended, in the sense that the set of all possible categories of things is unknown and unknowable.
Heterogeneity rules out aggregation, which, in turn, rules out quantitative prediction and control, but certainly does not rule out the type of ‘pattern prediction’ of which Hayek spoke. In fact, erroneously treating heterogeneous capital as though it were a quantifiable magnitude has led to misunderstandings and policy-errors, such as the those associated with the connection between investment and interest rates - errors that could have been avoided with a better understanding of capital heterogeneity and its effects. The capital-structure is complex, but it is intelligible. We can understand and describe in qualitative (abstract) terms how it works and render judgment on economic policies that affect it. And, as a result of Hayek’s insights into complex phenomena, we have an enhanced appreciation of what is involved.
-------------------------------
Baldwin, C. Y and K. B. Clark (2000), Design Rules (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
Langlois, Richard N. (2002), ‘Modularity in Technology and Organization,’ in Entrepreneurship and the Firm: Austrian Perspectives on Economic Organization, N. J. Foss and P. G. Klein, 24-47. Aldershot: Edward Elgar,.
Langlois, Richard N. (2012), ‘The Austrian Theory of the Firm: Retrospect and Prospect,’ Review of Austrian Economics, forthcoming.Monday, June 11, 2012
WHAT DO WE KNOW FOR CERTAIN ABOUT UNCERTAINTY?
Keynote Address:
Peter Lewin, University of Texas at Dallas
THE LEGATUM INSTITUTE
Charles
Street Symposium
SUNDAY, 10 JUNE, 2012
Chesterfield
Hotel
Thank you very much to the Legatum Institute and to Jeffrey Gedmin, Robert Hahn, Dalibor Rohac and Hemal Shah and all the organizers of this inaugural Charles Street Symposium. I am honored to have been invited and delighted to be part of this exciting venture.
My subject tonight is uncertainty and what we know about it. Surprise, mystery, anxiety and, of course, profit, are all implications of this phenomenon that we call uncertainty. Pretty much everything we know about humans in their social lives is connected to uncertainty, the fact that we do not know what is going to happen; people plan, they relish, they fear, but they don’t really “know” for sure what is going to happen. As George Shackle would say, we live in the fleeting present, imperfectly remembering the past, anticipating the uncertain future. In that sense the uncertain future is very much part of the present, and it shapes everything we are and everything we do.
So uncertainty refers to a “lack of knowledge” to the not-knowing. And we know that we don’t know. No less an authority than Donald Rumsfeld informs us:
The truth is, there are things we know, and we know we know them – the known knowns. There are things we know that we don’t know – the known unknowns. And there are unknown unknowns; the things we do not yet know that we do not know.
My topic tonight concerns this “meta-knowledge” – this knowledge of not-knowing. What does it mean to know that we don’t know? What is the nature of this knowledge, and what are its implications?
On this our teachers tell us different things? Permit me a brief account of my own experience. I came of age as an economist under the tutelage of Ludwig Lachmann. For him uncertainty was of the radical variety and it was lethal for the standard neoclassical framework. Unless economics as a discipline could figure out how to incorporate this real, this radical, uncertainty, it was doomed to irrelevance at best, and to the propagation of arrogantly administered disastrous economic policy at worst. Later, as I discovered the extensive work of Friederich Hayek, this approach was reinforced – though, of course, Lachmann and Hayek differ in some important respects. Hayek’s Nobel prize lecture on the ‘Pretense of Knowledge’ is the culmination of a particular way of thinking about uncertainty.
In September of 1972, I arrived at the University of Chicago as a Ph.D. student. My first class in price theory was taught by Milton Friedman. Frank Knight had very recently passed away, and my introduction to Friedman featured a box of unsold copies of Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit that had been brought from Knight’s office. These free copies were made available to us students on a first-come-first -served basis; and so it came to pass that the copy of Knight’s masterpiece that I have on my bookshelf is the one I received that day. But, more important for our subject tonight, is that, after the books were distributed, Friedman then presented us, his new students, with a short discourse about Knight’s central idea. He explained that Knight had thought that there was a fundamental difference between risk and uncertainty, because the latter could not be cast in a probability framework. Knight makes a distinction between decision-making contexts in which the list of possible outcomes is known, and probabilities can be assigned to the elements of this list; and contexts in which the list of possible outcomes is unknown. It may be, of course, that though the list of outcomes is known, their probabilities of occurring are not. This is a sort-of intermediate position between risk and uncertainty – but is perhaps closer to risk than uncertainty because at least the decision-maker can guess at the probabilities. The case of unknown, unimagined outcomes, is categorically different. It is genuine uncertainty and it is ubiquitous. It is the basis for entrepreneurial action and for profit.
In what seems to me a momentous turn, Friedman thought, as he told us that day, that Knight was mistaken, because, since the advent of modern statistical theory including Bayesian theory, we now know that it’s all a matter of how you set it up. Friedman suggested, and, of course this is the basis of the famous Friedman-Savage expected-utility choice theory, that all decisions were informed by a kind of subjective-probability analysis that allows the theorist to model decisions as if they were sampling from hypothetical probability distributions. The probabilities must add up to 100%, because whatever the decision-maker does not know about the possible outcomes can be allocated to a residual category which takes up the remaining, unallocated probability. It may be that this prior probability-distribution is not very informative – it may be a very diffuse prior distribution – but, in principle, says Friedman, there is no difference between risk and uncertainty.
What is being reflected here, in the different perspectives of Hayek and Friedman, is a difference in methodology that is wider than the Grand Canyon. Friedman is implementing the latter-day Chicago maxim, “if you can’t measure, measure anyway” because if you can’t measure you don’t really know. Hayek would of course say that if you try to measure the ummeasurable you engage in a pretense of knowledge. Less elegantly, the proverbial drunk man looking for his keys under the lamppost, comes to mind.
Though, confused at the time, as might be expected of a very average, unsophisticated graduate student, I have now come to think that Friedman’s approach is an instance of the wider “abuse of reason” that occupied Hayek for many decades. This refers to the presumption of economists, and some other social scientists, that what the physical sciences had taught us was that, everything is knowable, at least in principle, and that scientific progress consists of discovering those constant relationships among underlying variables, which correspond to real-world phenomena. In short, scientific progress consists of simply finding out how things work and we can do this by observing the world and its regularities.
Obviously, I don’t have the time, nor the inclination, to examine this fundamental issue tonight. I will just say that the Friedman (mainstream) position has come under attack from many directions, and is something shared by most, if not all, of the various schools of heterodox economics. We social scientists are starting to get comfortable with the idea that there is a lot that is unknown and is likely to remain so for a while, as well as the much more revolutionary idea, that there is a lot that is unknowable. So before we begin in earnest we need to dispose of this obligatory, well-known distinction between risk and uncertainty, which, I believe to be very real. The well-defined outcome of a game of chance is fundamentally, categorically different from the multitude of unknown and unknowable outcomes that we face every day as part of the unfolding of time. Novelty, surprise, the unimaginable are real. And it is this type of uncertainty that I will be talking about.
So I suggest that the first thing we know about uncertainty, is that it is real and it is radical. But what does that mean exactly? Does it mean simply and only that we don’t know what can and will happen? Does it mean that what will happen not yet determined? Or both? Is it just a matter of epistemology? Or is uncertainty a matter of the world itself, of ontology? On this one, I am going to punt. I don’t know. I have no knowledge of quantum mechanics and I have no understanding of what it means to say that a particle has the potential to be a wave but that this is not yet determined. In economics, in the work of Hayek, Lachmann, Mises, Keynes, Schumpeter, Simon, Kirzner, Taleb and many others we have the implication that there are certain things that we cannot know because they are part of very complex processes. We may understand these processes, and we may recognize outcomes as part of a wide range of permissible and intelligible outcomes, but we cannot “know” these processes sufficiently to predict outcomes in any detail, for example by predicting the values of certain measurable variables. So, the question we are begging and ignoring is basically; is this complexity a matter of knowledge or is the world intrinsically unpredictable, uncomputable, undecidable. Such are the debates in the field of modern “complexity studies,” and so I will leave it to them. What matters for us, it seems to me, is that uncertainty is real and we know this for sure.
What else do we know about uncertainty? Well we know that uncertainty is unavoidable. But it is not irremediable. The consequences of uncertainty can be mitigated. Most basically, there is insurance. For the life-insurance company, death is an instance of a class of homogeneous instances whose occurrence can be assigned a probability. The insurance company faces a situation akin to risk. For the individual, by contrast, death is a single unique event – a matter of extreme uncertainty. So the individual can leverage the difference to mitigate the consequences, at least for his heirs. In other ways, we act to minimize the consequences even of events that we cannot imagine, except to say that they are “bad”. And I think here there is a distinction to be made between unknowable, unimaginable future events and knowable possible categories of consequences that can result. And this may give us substantial theoretical traction, as in the use of agent-based modeling that the advent of the computer age has made so attractive.
We know also that uncertainty is uncomfortable, well mostly. Sometimes we like it, like when we read a mystery novel, or watch a football game. We don’t want to know what is going to happen. That would spoil the experience for us. Also, if uncertainty implies that the outcome is likely to be good, or when it postpones the arrival of something bad, we may welcome uncertainty. But in many other respects, uncertainty is definitely unpleasant. It is responsible for the anxiety we feel. And we know that in some cases this can be debilitating. In other, less extreme, cases it can be very costly.
On a recent visit to Tbilisi, Georgia I saw an interesting strategy for reducing uncertainty. The traffic lights are equipped with timers – they count down the seconds till the next change. In this way the motorist knows exactly when the light is going to change. Apparently this has reduced road-rage and car accidents. Is this an unintended metaphor? All action is planned action, by definition. It presupposes the categories of means and ends and thus causality. Uncertainty tends to disrupt this connection, to make our planning more difficult and fill us with apprehension. This is no more true than in the context of economic policy. Providing “timers” – solid constraints and interpretable signals - for economic policy could reduce the uncertainty we feel about it.
The words I quoted from Donald Rumsfeld were spoken in the context of assessing the consequences of going to war, and trying to make decisions about what to do next at each turn of events. It is but a graphic example of economic policy decision-making under real uncertainty. In this context, perhaps the most significant and startling implication of uncertainty is that it threatens the value-fact divide, the very possibility of wertfrei economics. Making informed policy-decisions in a world in which the consequences are radically uncertain, means that what you decide depends crucially on where you put the burden-of-proof – what you consider to be the default position, what you require to be disproved before action can be taken. The simplest, and most relevant example is the identification of a so-called “market-failure” prior to deciding that policy intervention is necessary. Will this imply proving that a market-failure exists, or, in other words, disproving the assumption that the market is efficient? Or will it imply, proving that the market is efficient and disproving the assumption that it is not? Whichever you choose, because we are dealing with real uncertainty and complex processes, it is probably impossible to disprove the null-hypothesis. Your choice, therefore, will depend not on disinterested science, but, rather on which type of error you consider most egregious and wish to avoid, in other words on your values. The greater the degree of causal ambiguity, the greater the importance of the burden-of-proof. And uncertainty is all about causal ambiguity.
Uncertainty can mean not only not-knowing what is going to happen. It can also imply not knowing how to deal with what happens when it does, not knowing how to act or how to fix something or how make something you will need. So, much of our discussion about uncertainty is about mitigating and coping mechanisms. An interesting case is the case of novelty in economic life. Economic growth and development are very much about the discovery and introduction of new products and services, new production methods, new resources and materials, new modes of organization, etc. Gaining and maintaining a competitive advantage in the marketplace involves being innovative. How can you plan for this? Much research these days is about what kinds of organizations are most likely to be innovative. It’s a big subject. I will say only that it is very much about the management of knowledge-generation within organizations in the same way that Hayek perceived of knowledge-generation in a decentralized market economy.
In fact, uncertainty is, from another systemic perspective, necessary, desirable and empowering. Without it life would be dull and it would be static. There would be no entrepreneur and there would be no profit, there would be no novelty, no need to figure out how to cooperate, so no Sesame Street moments, no mystery and, of course, no conferences like this. It would be a world completely different from our own. One of the thematic outcomes of my own work is the conviction that the world is becoming more uncertain all the time, even while our ability to deal with this uncertainty is improving dramatically. We generate and experience a greater degree of complexity and uncertainty precisely because we can handle it. In many ways that is the story of the information age.
But how, exactly, does this happen? I think the key is being able to predict, with sufficient degree of accuracy, what other people will do under various circumstances. As Adam Smith pointed out, each of us is dependent upon the cooperation of thousands of other people for even the most simple accoutrements of life. That is the miracle of the market. But the market would not work without a shared common language, without a firm shared basis in the law, in custom, in the norms we follow every day without even thinking about it. These social realities are what we often refer to as social institutions and they are what allow us to act in a world of radical uncertainty. So, I will end with an brief explanation of how I believe this occurs.
It’s all a matter of inconsistent expectations which lead to uncertain and complex
situations. As Hayek pointed out, the expectations of economic agents are
‘data’ for action. Expectations relating to uncertain future events imply the
introduction of the unpredictable expectations of others upon who actions the
success of our actions depends. Inconsistent expectations can mean inconsistent
actions, disorder and disequilibrium. The new-classical counterrevolution was
built on pointing out that expectations are best understood to be ‘rational’ –
hence not all that unpredictable. And that debate is still not quite over. But
I want to go in a different direction.
I suggest we need to unpack the concept of ‘expectations’ and ask the question ‘expectations of what?’ Obviously individuals have expectations about many different things. But, only some of these are likely to differ much across individuals. Those that form the basis of institutions, expectations about the ‘rules of game’ are likely to be very uniform across individuals. We may say that these expectations are informed by knowledge of the ‘social laws’ concerning how others will (almost) invariably behave in given situations. These expectations are likely to be very congruent. By contrast those expectations relating to the outcomes of introducing a new product, a new advertising approach, a new technology, a new competitive strategy, are not informed by such ‘hard’ knowledge. These are likely to be all over the place. Yet, such actions will not be deterred on account of the diffuseness of expectations and the uncertainty, the causal ambiguity that this implies. The entrepreneur acts precisely because he believes he is different and he knows better than the rest, absent which there would be no profit in it. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, predictability in one sphere of action is the necessary ingredient for coping with its absence (novelty) in another sphere. (Loasby 1991, 1994). We may invoke, as is often done, the analogy of a sports game, the fact that the outcome (the score, and the details of the action) cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty does not prevent the game from being played. On the contrary, it is this very unpredictability that adds to its attraction. What is predictable are the consequences of any infringement of the rules of the game, the fact that the losers will probably accept the result peacefully and so on. And it is this that allows the game to be played.
But whence the “rules of the game”? Another analogy - an individual walks across the mall full of snow and leaves a trail of footprints. Someone following him finds it helpful to walk in his footsteps (pun intended). Those who follow do the same and eventually they make a path through the snow that is of benefit to all who walk it (Kirzner 1992: Introduction). The original trailblazer is an unintentional institutional entrepreneur. The general principle here is the operation of network-effects – the more people use the network the greater the benefits for each (Liebowitz & Margolis 1994). Social institutions are complex phenomena and they are networks. A network of this kind is one in which the individuals who participate benefit from a shared (frequently tacit) understanding of how to proceed – a common standard (like a telephone technology, a language group, a religious group, a commonly accepted means of payment, a system of commercial laws, etc.). These ‘external benefits’ are the network effects that imply that there is feedback from individual action to other individuals, in the direction of producing uniform expectations regarding each other’s behavior (choices).
In this way, we can provide plausible choice-theoretic arguments showing how individuals perceive the benefits of choosing common modes of behavior. In other words, social institutions are likely to emerge spontaneously from individual action and to grow spontaneously to an optimum size. And there are many examples of convergent social processes, perhaps the most familiar being the emergence of money (Menger 1871).
Uncertainty exists, we know that for certain, but we also know that it has many aspects. Experience tells us that while we cannot predict who will succeed and who will not, while we cannot predict which products will emerge and be popular, while we cannot foresee the nature of future technologies, living in liberal democracies we strongly believe that the process will be peaceful and will be orderly. The fruits of this dynamic process depend crucially on our (predictable) willingness to accept the consequences of its unpredictability. That willingness is the vital predictable part. Indeed, as with other such complex adaptive orders, what we have in the market process is the emergence of an unpredictable but intelligible ‘order’ and we are able to explain this process in a readily accessible and intuitive way deriving from our understanding of human action. Uncertainty is real, it is unavoidable, but not irremediable, it is uncomfortable but it is necessary and it does not preclude us from acting. All of this we know for certain.
References:
Kirzner, I.
(1992). The Meaning of Market Process. London and New York: Routledge
Loasby, B.
(1991) Equilibrium and Evolution: An Exploration of Connecting Principles in
Economics Manchester: Manchester University Press.
______ (1994)
‘Evolution Within Equilibrium’, Advances in Austrian Economics. 1
Monday, May 28, 2012
Specialization and Spontaneous Order - more lessons for Obama
Perhaps it would have been more appropriate to have written
this on July 4, rather than on Memorial Day. But you can’t argue with
inspiration.
July 4 commemorates that date in the year of 1776, the date
we pick to mark the Declaration of
Independence and the launching of the grand and noble American experiment
that is still playing out. It so happens that 1776 is also the year of
publication of Adam Smith’s famous book, An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, more commonly
known simply as The Wealth of Nations.
It is not really an accident that these two works are so
close in timing. They share a common intellectual tradition, the ideas of
English liberalism that were ”in the air”
– and had been around for at least a hundred years dating back at least to
the works of John Locke and the other contributors to the English natural-law
tradition. For the first time in human history all individuals are seen as
possessing certain basic rights, simply by virtue of being human, the same
rights regardless of their station in life. Ironically, for most of human
history these rights were far from “self-evident.” But the American Revolution,
and the essence of the Constitution that followed, was predicated upon them –
the rights to life, liberty and property - even though amended by Benjamin
Franklin to read “the pursuit of happiness.” What is the connection?
Adam Smith’s work affirmed that secure individual rights to
property were absolutely necessary for a nation to prosper – a key to the
wealth of nations – and thus to the pursuit of happiness. And every infringement of that individual right,
however small, is an impediment to the attainment of that ideal. There are two
essential ideas in Smith’s work, that together fully explain the how this
works.
The first is the idea that productivity is the result of a
the division of labor – specialization,
leading to an improvement in knowledge, skills, expertise, etc. that enhance
production and lead to the introduction of new and improved methods and
products. But this division of labor has to be organized. People have to decide
what to do and how to do it, and their plans and actions needs to dovetail with
those of many others upon whom they depend. How is this “proper” division of
labor to be coordinated? As explained in my previous post, this is the function
of the market process, that system of natural property rights that results in
voluntary production and exchange on the basis of market-established prices
that act as both incentives and signals to do the “right thing.” So, it is not
from the benevolence of the butcher that we get our meat, but from his
attention to his own self-interest in the pursuit of profit. He is led by an
invisible hand to provide us with the meat that within his specialized ability
to produce. Coordination is not organized, it emerges spontaneously – it is a spontaneous order.
The invisible hand and the division of labor together provide
a basic understanding of how the market systems works – when it is allowed to
work. It is not perfect. The world is not, and will never be, perfect. People make
mistakes, lots of them. The pursuit of profits brings both profits and losses. But,
overall, this is the best, the only, system that is consistent with national
prosperity, with the escape from the poverty that was the common plight of most
people in the world prior to the modern era, and is still the plight of billions.
Like the Declaration
of Independence, Adam Smith’s Wealth
of Nations, reads as fresh today as the day it was written A great thinker
and communicator, Adam Smith’s message is one that all national leaders should
take to heart, including those of the nation whose founding documents were
based on it.
Friday, May 25, 2012
Profit maximization 101.
From yesterday's WSJ op-ed by Professor Paul Rubin: "In justifying his attacks on Bain Capital, President Obama argues that 'profit maximization' might be an appropriate goal for a private-equity firm, but not for more general public policy. This argument ignores one of the most basic premises of economics."
Don't you have to know any basic economics to
become a lawyer, never mind teach constitutional law at the University of
Chicago?! I mean everyone should know basically how markets work in order to
give us what we want. Shouldn't they?
As Adam Smith put it, we don't get the meat from the butcher because of his benevolence; but rather because he is intent on "maximizing" his profits, or, in other words, he does the best he knows how, to make his profits as big a possible within the constraints that he faces - including legal and moral constraints. It is not that he is greedy or uncaring. He may be, but he may be a wonderfully compassionate and generous individual. But deviating from his endeavor to maximize his profits may put him at a disadvantage to his competitors and leave us with less meat, from him. So while not intending our benefit, and intending only his own, he is led, by the invisible hand of the market, to provide us with what we want. Why? Because the market process works by making his interest coincide with ours. It is the only social mechanism that can do this, however imperfectly. It works by providing the butcher with incentives to be efficient in the provision of what we want when we want it, to use his special and particular knowledge and abilities in doing so, and to be alert to new opportunities to do so better, opportunities that he is in a special position to recognize and exploit. To repeat, by being successful he benefits not only himself but also all those whom he serves. His “greed” is kept in check by the completion or potential competition of those who would like to fill his place by promising to serve us better.
How else could
his “greed” be kept in check? By regulation? On what basis? Who would decide
how much profit is sufficient, reasonable? How do the regulators get this privileged
knowledge? Why should we trust them? What incentive do they have to get it
right? What good does it do to try and “shame” profit-earners into adopting
some other goal? None, it will either be completely ineffective or produce more
harm than good.
To require that businessmen should not strive to maximize profits, as President Obama seems to want to do, betrays either a woeful ignorance of how things work, or a crass hypocrisy. Either way its not good and it tends to perpetuate the kind of economic illiteracy that has gotten us into so much trouble.
To require that businessmen should not strive to maximize profits, as President Obama seems to want to do, betrays either a woeful ignorance of how things work, or a crass hypocrisy. Either way its not good and it tends to perpetuate the kind of economic illiteracy that has gotten us into so much trouble.
Wednesday, May 23, 2012
A Greek Tragedy?
Greece is fast approaching the wall. How ironic that NPR and
the BBC see fit to report the news as though this is something that is caused by Germany’s hard-nosed refusal to modify its
demand for meaningful and credible fiscal reform. Interview with man-in-the-street who blames the Greek government and Germany, but mainly Germany. Ergo,
its Germany. Sure, when I can’t pay my credit-card bill, that’s the credit-card
company’s fault, right?
All the pundits I read suggest that Greece exiting the Euro-zone
is a bad thing for everybody. I don't see it. Sure it’s bad for Greece and the
Greeks - because it will mean a resort to unconstrained growth in domestic-currency-financed-government-spending,
in other words, growth of government and a shrinking of the already shriveled
private economy. And this will lead to inflation, the worst and most
destructive of all taxes, which will lead sooner or later - probably not so
later - to economic meltdown. By that time probably most of the Greek labor
force will have emigrated.
But, it would be a good thing for the Euro-zone if it sent a
clear message to the rest of the PIGS - the PIS - and maybe France too with its
brand-new, rich, swanky, socialist president. A Euro-zone with one less
deadbeat to support, and the rest in fear for their economic lives, why is that
bad? The bond-holders take their knocks – what’s left to take. Some real belt-tightening
occurs. Things would definitely get better after that. Of course, that’s a best-case
scenario.
I don’t know the political details well enough to know what
spurred Angela Merkel to hold fast, what vested interests, what real
principles. Whatever it was, good for her!!
Saturday, May 12, 2012
The Financial Fiasco is not a Market Problem
Good piece by Holman Jenkins in today's WSJ:
Obama+Frank+Dodd=Market uncertainty and incentives to get too big to fail by accumulating risky assets. How ironic!
Mark-to-market is a dysfunctional regulation that is based on the fiction that the value of durable assets are accurately assessed at any point in time by the "market." At the bottom of this is a profound misunderstanding of the fundamental nature of "value." The value of any (financial) asset at any point in time depends on what those who pay money to buy it think will happen in the future. It is NOT some mystical, objective number that the application of esoteric, rocket-science type formula will reveal. Finance is categorically different from physics. Value depends on what people think will happen, and different people think different things will happen (sometimes exactly opposite of each other). Regulators are not in some privileged position. They are, if anything, less likely to be right than the "expert" traders, who have both a greater incentive and more detailed knowledge and experience to get it right. But, even they, the experts, will be wrong - often - that is the way the market works. Sometimes they win, sometimes they and their clients lose. Regulation, by making the financial environment more uncertain, creates a greater disparity of outcomes and encourages irresponsible behavior by trying to shield us from failure. Too big to fail is just too big!
Friday, April 13, 2012
What does the wicked son really say?
According to the traditional Passover text, the Hagada (the telling), there are four sons who
ask questions about the Passover seder (order,
the traditional ritual meal at which the Hagada is read), as follows:
The Torah refers to four
sons: One wise, one wicked, one simple and one who does not know how to ask a
question. What does the wise son say? "What are the testimonials, statutes
and laws Hashem [the name] our God commanded you?" You should tell him
about the laws of Pesach, that one may eat no dessert after eating the Pesach
offering.
What does
the wicked son say? "What does this drudgery mean to you?" To you and
not to him. Since he excludes himself from the community, he has denied a basic
principle of Judaism. You should blunt his teeth by saying to him: "It is
for the sake of this that Hashem (God) did for me when I left Egypt. For me and
not for him. If he was there he would not have been redeemed."
What does the simple son say? "What's
this?" You should say to him "With a strong hand Hashem took me out
of Egypt, from the house of servitude."
And the one who does not know how to ask, you
start for him, as the Torah says: "And you should tell your son on that
day, saying 'It is for the sake of this that Hashem did for me when I left
Egypt.'"
There are many creative commentaries on this within the
tradition. The sons are, of course, meant to refer to four different
temperaments or attitudes. The wicked
son is seen as a threat. He has a really bad attitude, his skepticism is
dangerous. He needs to be brought to heel or banished. Here is an example.
"The wicked son's 'question' is merely rhetorical - it deserves no
response at all. Yet, the one who does not know how to ask is sitting at the
table listening to the wicked son's remarks. He's in danger of being
influenced. Therefore, our response to the wicked son is to say to the one who
doesn't even know how to ask: "Don't be influenced by his smug cynicism.
Had he been in Egypt, he would not have been redeemed. He is cutting
himself off from the eternity of the Jewish people."(http://ohr.edu/805).
But actually, I have it on good
authority, that the wicked son was not so wicked at all and was really trying
to open up a searching dialogue based on some very deep-seated reservations and
doubts which troubled him. What appears above as his question is actually just a very short extract of the end of his true question (or series of related questions). This text, hitherto suppressed, has been
discovered and I can present it to you in its entirety. His so-called question has to be understood
in the context of the whole text. [Of course I cannot reveal my source].
_________________________________________________________________________________
So, the Jews are
enslaved in Egypt. They face an evil Pharoh. Moses shakes him up, but God “hardens
his heart“ so that time and again he
refuses to let the Israelites go in
spite of the increasing severity of the plagues. Why does God harden Pharoh’s
heart? Does this mean it is not Pharoh’s fault? After all, he has no choice
– God controls his heart. So why is he the bad one? And what about the
collateral damage? How are the poor Egyptian first born sons to blame? Why are
they punished, they are just kids? Come to think of it, since it is God who is
pulling all the strings, why did God
allow the Israelites to become slaves in the first place?
Of course, this
brings up the whole question of free-will and how to reconcile it with God’s all-embracing
power and goodness. You will say to me that these are unanswerable questions
not relevant when talking about God. God is outside of human time and morality
and has his own grand plan that we mere mortals cannot possibly understand. Ok, but why then
are we encouraged to ask questions, especially during the seder. Does God want
us to be curious, and to have our curiosity satisfied or not? Seems to me you
can’t have it both ways.
If one believes in a
good and merciful God, it makes more sense to me to conclude that he cannot be
all-powerful (HT: Rabbi Harold Kushner). Some things are beyond his control and
he empathizes with those who suffer. In which case why go through the all those
parts in the Hagada that seem to deny this. After all, what does this drudgery
mean to you?
Wednesday, April 4, 2012
The future of Egypt?
It boggles my mind listening to NPR-type commentators minimizing the downside of an Islamist victory in Egypt's impending election. I hear them suggesting that the more "moderate" of the two fundamentalist candidates might actually not be so bad, that he might turn out to be conveniently pragmatic on enough things to balance the significant dose of Islam that most Egyptians want in their lives.
What kind of mental reality do they live in? Don't they understand that this "moderate" will impose a theocratic dictatorship that will regulate almost every aspect of private life, including free speech, freedom of religion, education, you name it, not to mention the imposition of restrictions on women? Religious minorities will be persecuted. And the peace treaty with Israel will be scrapped as they funnel arms into Gaza.
Why does the "left" not understand that there is no compromise with the principle of excluding religion from political power? The fusing of church and state always destroys democracy and freedom. Fundamentalist religion (based on divine revelation) cannot abide dissent, cannot coexist in power with pluralism.
You expect this from the "right" not the "left," the so-called liberals. I see a combination of patronizing elitism and wishful thinking. They see the poverty stricken, repressed Arab world as pitiful. They think it is probably "our" fault. They think we should not impose our culturally-biased political principles on them, ergo we should accept anything they come up with as "their way of doing things." Give them the benefit of the doubt. Don't criticize. Hope for the best.
What kind of mental reality do they live in? Don't they understand that this "moderate" will impose a theocratic dictatorship that will regulate almost every aspect of private life, including free speech, freedom of religion, education, you name it, not to mention the imposition of restrictions on women? Religious minorities will be persecuted. And the peace treaty with Israel will be scrapped as they funnel arms into Gaza.
Why does the "left" not understand that there is no compromise with the principle of excluding religion from political power? The fusing of church and state always destroys democracy and freedom. Fundamentalist religion (based on divine revelation) cannot abide dissent, cannot coexist in power with pluralism.
You expect this from the "right" not the "left," the so-called liberals. I see a combination of patronizing elitism and wishful thinking. They see the poverty stricken, repressed Arab world as pitiful. They think it is probably "our" fault. They think we should not impose our culturally-biased political principles on them, ergo we should accept anything they come up with as "their way of doing things." Give them the benefit of the doubt. Don't criticize. Hope for the best.
Saturday, March 31, 2012
So, what is so important about "capital?"
With the resurgence of Keynesian
economic policy as a response to the current crisis, echoes of past
debates are being heard - in particular,
the debate from the 1930’s between John Maynard Keynes and Friederich Hayek. Keynes
talked about the “capital stock” of the economy. He argued that by stimulating
spending on outputs (consumption goods and services) one can increase
productive investment (adding to the capital stock) to meet that spending, thus
adding to the capital stock and increasing employment. Hayek accused Keynes of
insufficient attention to the nature of capital in production. (By “capital” is
meant here the physical production structure of the economy, including things
like machinery, buildings, raw materials, and, we should also include, human
capital). Hayek pointed out that capital investment does not simply add to
production in a general way, but, rather, is embodied in concrete capital
items. The productive capital of the economy is not simply an amorphous “stock”
of generalized production power; rather it is a very intricate production
structure of interrelated complementary specific production items. Stimulating
spending and investment amounts to stimulating specific sections and components
of this intricate structure. The “shape” of production gets changed by
stimulatory activist spending. And,
given that productive resources are not free, this change comes at the expense
of productive effort elsewhere. The pattern of production gets out of sync with
the pattern of consumption and eventually this must lead to a collapse.
Productive sectors, like dot.com start-ups or residential housing, become
“overbought” (while other sectors develop less) and eventually a “correction”
must occur. Add this “distortionary” effect to the fact that the original
stimulus must somehow eventually be paid for and we have a predictable bust.
These Hayekian criticisms are
once again relevant. It is necessary therefore to return to the nature of
capital in order to, once again, clarify the issues. Hayek was working from
foundations that were developed by his intellectual forebears in the Austrian
School of Economics. Specifically, it is the Austrian Theory of Capital that is
relevant and we should begin with that.
The best known Austrian capital
theorist was Eugene von Böhm-Bawerk, though his teacher Carl Menger is the one who
got the ball rolling, providing the central idea upon which Böhm-Bawerk
elaborated. Böhm-Bawerk produced three volumes dedicated to the study of
capital and interest, making the Austrian Theory of Capital its most well-known
theoretical contribution. He provided a very detailed account of the
fundamentals of capitalistic production. Later contributors include Hayek,
Ludwig Lachmann and Israel Kirzner. They added to and enriched Böhm-Bawerk’s
account in crucial ways. The legacy we now have is a rich tapestry that accords
amazingly well with the nature of production in the digital-information-age. Some
current contributors along these lines include Peter Klein, Nicolai Foss, Howard
Baetjer, Peter Lewin and others.
The Austrians emphasize the fact
that production takes time, and the more indirect it is, the more “time” it
takes. Production today is much more “roundabout” (Böhm-Bawerk’s term) than
older more rudimentary production processes. Rather than picking the fruit in
our back yard and eating it, most of us today get our fruit from fruit farms
using complex picking, sorting, packing machinery to process carefully
engineered fruit items. Consider the amount of “time” (for example in
“people-hours”) involved in setting up and assembling all the pieces of this
complex production process from scratch – from before the manufacture of the
machines, etc. – and this gives us some idea of what is meant by production
methods that are “roundabout.”
[The scare quotes above are
used because, in fact, there is no perfectly rigorous way define the length of
a production process in purely physical terms. But, intuitively, what is being
asserted is that doing things in a more complicated, specialized way is more
difficult – loosely speaking it takes more “time” because it is more
“roundabout,” more indirect.]
Through countless self-interested
individual production decisions, we have adopted more roundabout methods of
production, because they are more productive – they add more value - than less
roundabout methods. Were this not the case, they would not be deemed worth the
sacrifice and effort of the “time” involved– and would be abandoned in favor of
more direct production methods. What is at work here are the benefits of
specialization – the division of labor to which Adam Smith referred. Modern
economies are complex, specialized economies in which the many specialized
steps necessary to produce any product are connected in a sequentially specific
network – some things have to be done before others. There is a time-structure
to the capital-structure.
This intricate time-structure is
partially organized, partially spontaneous (organic). Every production process
is the result of some multi-period production plan. Entrepreneurs envision the
possibility of providing (new, improved, cheaper) products to consumers whose
expenditure on them will be more than sufficient to cover the cost of producing
them. In pursuit of this vision the entrepreneur plans to assemble the
necessary capital items in a synergistic combination. These capital-combinations
are structurally composed modules that are the ingredients of the industry- or
economy-wide capital-structure. The latter is the result then of the dynamic
interaction of multiple entrepreneurial plans in the marketplace – it is what
constitutes the market process. Some plans will prove more successful than
others, some will have to be modified to some degree, some will fail. What
emerges is a structure that is not planned by anyone in its totality, but is
the result of many individual actions in the pursuit of profit – it is an
unplanned structure that has a logic, a coherence, to it. It was not designed,
and it could not have been designed, by any human mind or committee of minds.
Thinking that it is possible to design such a structure or even to micro-manage
it with macro-economic policy is a fatal conceit.
The division of labor reflected
by the capital-structure is based on a division
of knowledge. Within and across firms specialized tasks are accomplished by
those who know best how to accomplish them. Such localized, often unconscious,
knowledge could not be communicated to or collected by centralized
decision-makers. The market process is responsible not only for discovering who
should do what and how, but also how to organize it so that those best able to
make decisions are motivated to do so. In other words, incentives and knowledge
considerations tend to get balanced spontaneously in a way that could not be
planned on a grand scale. The boundaries of firms expand and contract and new
forms of organization evolve. This too is part of the capital-structure broadly
understood.
In addition, the heterogeneous
capital goods that make-up the cellular capital-combinations also reflect the
division of knowledge. Capital goods (like specialized machines) are employed
because they “know” how to do certain important things; they embody the
knowledge of their designers about how to perform the tasks for which they were
designed. The entire production-structure is thus based on an incredibly
intricate extended division of knowledge, such knowledge being spread across
its multiple physical and human capital components. Modern production
management is more than ever knowledge management, whether involving human
beings or machines – the key difference being that the latter can be owned and
require no incentives to motivate their production, while the former depend on
“relationships” but possess initiative and judgment, in a way that machines do
not.
The foregoing provides the barest
account of the rich legacy of Austrian capital theory, but should be sufficient
to communicate the essential differences in the way Austrians view the economy,
compared to those using perspectives from other schools of thought. For
Austrians the whole macro-economic approach is problematic, involving, as it
does, the use of gross aggregrates as targets for policy manipulation –
aggregates like the economy’s “capital stock.” For Austrians there is no
“capital stock.” Any attempt to aggregate the multitude of diverse capital
items involved in production into a single aggregate number is bound to result
in a meaningless outcome – a number devoid of significance. Similarly the total
of investment spending does not reflect in any accurate way the addition to
value that can be produced by this “capital stock.” The value of capital goods and of capital
combinations or of the businesses in which they are employed, are determined
only as the market process unfolds over time. They are based on the
expectations of the entrepreneurs who hire them, and these expectations
are diverse and often inconsistent. Not
all of them will prove correct – indeed most will be, at least to some degree,
proven false. Basing macro-economic policy on an aggregate of values for assembled
capital items as recorded or estimated at one point of time, would seem to be a
fool’s errand. What do the policy-makers know that the entrepreneurs involved
in the micro aspects of production do not?
The folly is compounded by
connecting capital and investment aggregates to total employment, under the
assumption that stimulating the former will stimulate the latter. Such an
assumption ignores the heterogeneity and structural nature of both capital and
labor (human-capital). Simply boosting expenditure on any kind of production
will not guarantee adding to the employment of people without jobs. How else to
explain the fact that our current economy is characterized by both sizeable
unemployment numbers and job-vacancies? Their coexistence is a result of a structural
mismatch – the structure, the pattern of skills, of the unemployed does not
match those required to be able to work with the specific capital items that
are currently unemployed.
In fact, the current enduring
recession is basically structural in nature. It is the bust of a credit-induced
boom-bust cycle, augmented by far-reaching production distorting regulation.
The Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle was developed first by Ludwig von
Mises, combining insights from the Austrian Theory of Capital with the nature
of modern central-bank led monetary policy. The theory was later used, with
some differences, by Hayek in his debates with Keynes. And over the years its
popularity and acceptance has waxed and waned. But it appears to be highly
relevant to our current situation.
The dot-com boom no doubt
reflected the advent of a pervasive new technological environment – the arrival
and expansion of the digital age. It was a time of great promise and
uncertainty and of enhanced risk-taking. Astronomical book values reflected
expectations that in total could not be realized. A shake-up was inevitable –
and known to be so. It was part of the market process. As the boom deepened
interest rates started to rise, reflecting the increased demand for a limited supply
of loanable funds. This, as Hayek would have put it, is the natural brake of
the economy, the signal and the incentive to slow down. But the Federal
Reserve, not wishing to spoil the party, expanded reserves in order to keep
interest rates low, thus allowing the boom to progress beyond its “natural”
life. When the bust came it was bigger than it would have been had the cycle
been allowed to run its natural course.
Notice how this story accords
with our understanding of the capital-structure. The expanding boom reflected
entrepreneurs’ expectations of profitably making new capital combinations, only
some of which would, in the event, prove to be profitable. But there was no
way, ahead of time, to know which they were. That is why we need markets. Rising
interest rates, and the passage of time, would tend to reveal the less viable
ventures and weed them out. Keeping interest rates artificially low prevented
this from happening, moreso for those projects that were more
interest-sensitive, namely, those that were longer-lived, that had a longer
time-horizon – or, loosely speaking, in terms of our earlier discussion,
contained more “time.”
But the dot-com collapse did not
really mark the end of the cycle. Much of the extra liquidity was then directed
into real estate, specifically into residential housing and into financial
assets based on it. This investment channel was wide open as a result of a
decades long, recently intensifying, Congressional and regulatory policy to
expand home-ownership in America. This is a familiar story that need not be
repeated here. The result was an unprecedented expansion of home-building and
home purchases riding up the tsunami wave of home prices. Once again the
production structure was pushed out of sync with any kind of sustainable
pattern of consumption.
The solution, from this
perspective, is to remove the distortions – to allow the market process to
“re-structure” production. This would mean a sustained period of consolidation
in the housing market, not a policy that attempts to revive it (to revive the
bubble?) of the kind we are currently witnessing. But then, today’s
policy-makers do not have the benefit of knowing Austrian Capital Theory to
guide them.
Tuesday, January 31, 2012
Is anti-Zionism a form of racism?
A friend once told me that "anti-Zionists" (as opposed to anti-Semites) can be defined as: Those who think that the founding of the state of Israel was a political or legal or moral mistake.
Based on this "reasonable" definition, I am inclined to say that "anti-Zionism is racism." (Remember the infamous "Zionism is racism" UN resolution.)
Explanation: After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI Britain and France pretty much dominated the Middle East and carved out various spheres of influence. From the late inter-war period, under the auspices of the League of Nations, until the end of WWII (circa 1949) the great powers tinkered with the borders, eventually carving out what is now Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Israel. (Egypt was pretty much intact already). So all of these countries are basically "colonial" creations. In fact the colonial powers even played one family against the rest, placing the Hashemites in Jordan, Iraq and Syria. All of these were basically the outcome of statist imperialism.
Now these anti-Zionists object to the creation of the state of Israel, but not the Kingdom of Jordan, or Iraq, Syria or Lebanon (whose borders changed quite often and dramatically in this period). Question: If Israel had been created as a Moslem state like the rest of them, would the anti-Zionists be objecting now? If the answer is no, then it is the Jewish nature of Israel that is the problem and not really the circumstances of its creation.
Based on this "reasonable" definition, I am inclined to say that "anti-Zionism is racism." (Remember the infamous "Zionism is racism" UN resolution.)
Explanation: After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI Britain and France pretty much dominated the Middle East and carved out various spheres of influence. From the late inter-war period, under the auspices of the League of Nations, until the end of WWII (circa 1949) the great powers tinkered with the borders, eventually carving out what is now Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Israel. (Egypt was pretty much intact already). So all of these countries are basically "colonial" creations. In fact the colonial powers even played one family against the rest, placing the Hashemites in Jordan, Iraq and Syria. All of these were basically the outcome of statist imperialism.
Now these anti-Zionists object to the creation of the state of Israel, but not the Kingdom of Jordan, or Iraq, Syria or Lebanon (whose borders changed quite often and dramatically in this period). Question: If Israel had been created as a Moslem state like the rest of them, would the anti-Zionists be objecting now? If the answer is no, then it is the Jewish nature of Israel that is the problem and not really the circumstances of its creation.
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